I have previously written about the case of Kirralie Smith. Ms Smith is part of an advocacy organisation, Binary Australia Ltd, which advocates for sex-based rights, especially for women, and sometimes posts about biological males who have been allowed to compete in women’s sport. Stephanie Blanch (and Riley Dennis) were mentioned on the website of Binary and elsewhere online in this context, and then claimed that this amounted to “transgender vilification” under section 38S(1)(a) of the NSW Anti-Discrimination Act 1975 (“ADA”). The plaintiffs in the original litigation were each described by Deputy Chief Magistrate Freund as a “transgender woman”, and were both born biologically male.

In the earlier proceedings (judgments linked in my previous post) Smith was found to have committed vilification, ordered to pay a total of $95,000 in damages to the two plaintiffs, and found liable for costs. An appeal was lodged, and the NSW Supreme Court (Rigg J) has now handed down a judgment granting leave to appeal in some respects, but mostly dismissing the appeal grounds: see Smith v Blanch; Smith v Dennis [2026] NSWSC 879 (24 July 2026) (Blanch and Dennis Supreme Court Appeal, “BDSCA”). Smith remains liable to pay $95,000, is forbidden “from publishing on social media or otherwise anything relating to the defendant[s] to the same or similar effect as held to be unlawful vilification in [the previous] Local Court proceedings” – see BDSCA [261], [262]. She also has to pin a notice about the proceedings “on all social media pages and websites over which [she has] control, including Facebook, Instagram and X (formerly known as Twitter) and the website of Binary Australia”, for 3 months. (See Annexure A to BDSCA for the content.)  

In this post I will aim to explain the basis for the court’s decision. As will be seen, I think there may be grounds for a further appeal.

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